How Premature Palestinian Statehood Recognition Undermines Peace and Empowers Hamas

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The push to recognize a Palestinian state hurts Israel, doesn’t help Palestinians, and empowers Hamas.

It’s a little-known fact that one of Hamas’ most consistent demands throughout the post-October 7 hostage negotiations has been the release of Marwan Barghouti, a prominent Palestinian political activist and terrorist serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison. Israel has accused Barghouti of playing a role in several deadly terrorist attacks. The fact that Hamas wants an accused terrorist and murderer released might seem unsurprising, except for the fact that Barghouti is associated with Hamas’ chief rival in Palestinian politics: Fatah.

When we use terms like “chief rival” to describe Palestinian politics, we should not mistake the conflict between these two groups as a bloodless, American-style political contest over congressional seats. When Hamas took over Gaza in 2007-2009, they conducted a bloody purge of Fatah loyalists. Yahya Sinwar, the butcher responsible for October 7, was actually imprisoned in Israel for killing his fellow Palestinians, among whom Fattah loyalists were certainly included. Out of self-preservation, Fattah has done everything in its power to weaken Hamas, including collaborating with Israel against Hamas at times.

So, why would Hamas push for the release of an ardent Fatah loyalist? Because much of the competition between Fatah and Hamas is over tactics. Fatah has relied on a less violent, less confrontational strategy toward Israel to achieve its stated desire for a Palestinian state. Hamas, by contrast, has used violence against Israel to try and achieve its stated goal of wiping the Jewish state off the map. In pushing for Barghouti’s release, Hamas seeks to make a statement that even Fatah’s goals can only be achieved by Hamas’ means. This would give Hamas a clear political advantage in the internal Palestinian struggle and, ultimately, serve to further radicalize the already radicalized Palestinian population.

The Barghouti story is an instructive one, as we watch Western governments’ lemming-like rush to recognize a Palestinian state this week. Hamas has no desire for a Palestinian state as these Western governments understand it: namely, a state comprised of the territories occupied by Jordan and Egypt before 1967, which is committed to living in some form of peace with Israel. But the insane rush to recognize such an entity, even though it very plainly does not exist on the ground, would nevertheless be a huge win for Hamas. Like the attempt to secure Barghouti’s release, Hamas would be able to argue it had achieved one of Fatah’s main goals as a direct result of its October 7 attacks on Israel. Mahmud Abbas could never publicly say so, but this would be the single biggest reversal of fortunes for Fatah since the PLO was recognized as the legal representative of the Palestinian people in 1988.

It is unlikely that Western leaders Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, Mark Carney, Anthony Albanese, et al., are actually trying to empower Hamas at the expense of Fatah by recognizing a Palestinian state. All of them have made noises about their opposition to Hamas, desire for Hamas to disarm, leave power and let the hostages go, etc. Their stated goal is the preemption of any move toward annexation by Israel’s right-wing government, which they regard as entirely beholden to extreme, settler interests. Unfortunately, it’s also not clear what they think this premature recognition will positively accomplish on the ground.

To be clear, premature recognition of a Palestinian state is a terrible idea on many fronts. First, it is dangerous on geopolitical grounds. It undermines any leverage Israel might have in its attempts to end the war, get the hostages home, and build a future for Gaza with which Israel can live — and in which Gaza’s population can enjoy at least a modicum of peace and prosperity. It also limits the freedom of action of other Arab states, like the Emiratis, who may want to play their own constructive role in Gaza’s future. Widespread Western recognition of a Palestinian state will almost certainly lead these governments to push for a Palestinian Authority (PA) takeover of Gaza. Practically, however, the PA barely has the capacity to “govern” area A in Judea and Samaria — a “governance” which has led to higher approval ratings for Hamas than Fatah in PA areas. Also, with the boost in legitimacy Hamas would gain from such recognition, the PA would run a very high risk of losing control of Gaza again, as it did in the late 2000s.

One might argue that recognition of a Palestinian state would help the Palestinian people. Yet, it’s difficult to see exactly how. Simply put, there is no entity in Palestinian politics that has anything like governance capacity, even in the Arab areas of Judea and Samaria. The PA lacks a monopoly of force. Even as far back as the Second Intifada, the PA police and security forces lacked either the desire or the capacity to stop suicide bombings — quite possibly both.

The situation has not grown any better under the rule of Mahmud Abbas, whose longevity as President of the Palestinian Authority extends beyond that of some regional dictators. The PA excels at manipulating Western public opinion. Governance of the Palestinian areas already entrusted to its control? Not so much. In short, Western governments would be recognizing a “state” that lacks a monopoly of force, legitimacy within the population, or even the demonstrated ability to beat its political and military rivals within Palestinian politics and society. The best-case scenario would be a failed state. In the worst case, Hamas would gain effective control of a “state” recognized by most of the West. Neither of those outcomes make the lives of the Palestinian population better.

Finally, recognition of a Palestinian state, at this stage, would unduly perpetuate one of the primary causes of Gaza’s under-development, Palestinian radicalization, and the prevention of a just and lasting peace: UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). It cannot be stated often enough that there are Palestinian “refugees” living in territory controlled by the PA. In fact, there were Palestinian “refugees” living in the pre-1967 regions of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which were under the control of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. These refugees are descendants, sometimes to the fourth generation, of Arabs who left or were expelled from the 1948 boundaries of Israel.

The PA had de jure control of Gaza, as well as majority-Arab areas of Judea and Samaria, since 1994. At no point during that time has the PA tried to re-settle these 1948 refugees within its territory. Most of Gaza’s residents have refugee status; in practice, this means they view Gaza as a temporary home from which they are waiting to return to their great grandparents’ property in Israel. There are even reports that the PA has made it difficult for refugees to legally sell deeds to their property to Israelis.

There has been some discussion of the refugee issue from a radicalization perspective. We now know UNRWA and Hamas were inseparable in Gaza and UNRWA officials actually participated in October 7. But there is a more subtle problem: A permanent refugee population in Gaza is unlikely to make permanent investments and commitments to Gaza. If Gaza is a temporary waystation on the way to repatriation, its political, economic, and infrastructure development will always be secondary to the struggle against Israel and the preservation of the so-called “right of return.” More broadly, how can a Palestinian state live in peace with Israel when a substantial segment of its population is permanently committed to the destruction of Israel as a necessary precondition for ending refugee status?

In short, by recognizing a Palestinian state, Western countries would be creating a failed state with no governance capacity, no sovereignty, and a nominal commitment to Israel, which is constantly undermined by both the necessary ideology of the refugee population and the boost to Hamas caused by the circumstances of that recognition. It does no good to the Palestinian people, material, and measurable harm to Israel, sowing the seeds of future conflicts that will cause suffering for all. It also establishes a terrible precedent: If states can be recognized with no concern for facts on the ground, what will stop a future recognition of secessionist regions within these countries? People living in the glass house of regional discontent, as Britain, Spain, and Canada all do, ought not throw the stone of unilateral recognition at other countries, lest others eventually do the same unto them.

All of which raises the question: Why do it? The answer is complicated but has little to do with a real desire to ameliorate suffering in Gaza or build a better future for the Palestinians. The most charitable interpretation is that the Europeans fear elements of Netanyahu’s coalition will push to alter the population of Gaza. In this regard, comments by far-right ministers, such as Minister for Internal Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, have contributed to this perception. Still, Netanyahu has never demonstrated any appetite for a renewed settlement project in Gaza. In fact, in his previous stint as Prime Minister, Netanyahu sacrificed any assertion of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria at the time in exchange for the Abraham Accords. Obviously, circumstances have changed after October 7, but even so, most Israelis have no interest in restoring the small pre-disengagement Gazan settlements.

On the other hand, the most cynical explanation of the sudden push for recognition of Palestinian statehood also involves domestic politics: in the West, not Israel. According to this narrative, left-wing governments in Canada, Australia, Britain, and France are seeking to appease their own growing Muslim populations. As with the charitable explanation, there is probably some truth in this claim — but only some. None of these parties can win on Muslim votes alone after all, and in Britain, France, and Canada, the right’s staunch opposition to immigration will likely keep Muslim voters in alliance with the Left regardless of the governments’ Palestine position.

The most plausible explanation is also the simplest: A block of left-wing Western leaders is choosing to live in a fantasy land, where diplomatic recognition of a Palestinian state will magically create one. After all, the global Left has become obsessed with the idea that speech is violence and violence speech. It is not a long intellectual journey from this notion to the idea that speech can create a state where, currently, none exists.

In short, Starmer, Macron, Carney, Albanese and their fellow travelers are sticking their heads in the sand and wishing away the complex problems that make a Palestinian state impossible in September 2025. As the old joke about instructions for riding an elephant says: “First, assume the existence of an elephant.” This is the height of folly, but it is a politically correct folly that pleases the “right” people and harms the “wrong” people. Fortunately, it is also a folly President Trump is disinclined to indulge.

Hopefully, America’s unwillingness to go along will limit at least some of the negative consequences. Yet, Trump won’t be president forever, and the Western Left has now set a precedent a future Democratic candidate for commander-in-chief might be inclined to follow. Thus, it is important to emphasize the best thing that could happen to the Palestinian population in Gaza, or Judea and Samaria, is a long period of concentrated political and economic development, coupled with a sober recognition that no actor in Palestinian politics today has demonstrated the willingness and/or capacity to deliver it. Absent that development, premature recognition of a non-existent state remains the height of folly.